What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter Requirement by Langevoort, Donald C
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2012 
What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter 
Requirement 
Donald C. Langevoort 
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-111 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/989 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120141 
 
Donald C Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter Requirement, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING (Stephen Bainbridge, ed., Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd. forthcoming) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, 
and the Securities Law Commons 
1 
 
What were they thinking? Insider trading and the scienter requirement 
Donald C. Langevoort 
 
On its face, the connection between insider trading regulation and the state of mind of the 
trader or tipper seems fairly intuitive. Insider trading is a form of market abuse: taking advantage 
of a material, non-public secret to which one is not entitled, generally in breach of some kind of 
fiduciary-like duty. It is an exploitation of status or access, typically coupled with some form of 
faithlessness. Certainly the extraordinary public attention that insider trading enforcement and 
prosecutions command reflects the idea that the essence of unlawful insider trading is cheating. 
These prosecutions are main-stage morality plays, with greed as the story line.1 The SEC in 
particular seems to sense that it garners public political support by casting itself in the role of 
tormentor of the greedy.  
If this is right, then what the legal system should be looking to proscribe is deliberate 
exploitation—trading on the basis of information in order to gain an unfair, unlawful advantage 
over others in the marketplace. That involves a fairly tight causal connection between knowledge 
of the information and the decision to buy or sell.  
This Chapter will examine both the law and the psychology associated with this pursuit. 
The USA law of insider trading is actually much more conflicted and confusing as to the 
necessary state of mind for either trading or tipping.2 Mostly, this is a product of conceptual 
                                                
1 See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of 
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1999). 
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confusion in how we define unlawful insider trading—the quixotic effort to build a coherent 
theory of insider trading by reference to the law of fraud, rather than a more expansive market 
abuse standard. It is familiar enough that the courts (at the SEC’s urging) have taken dominion of 
the law of insider trading by deeming it a species of fraud. That is intellectually awkward 
because there is relatively little about unlawful insider trading that can fairly be considered 
deceptive, yet deception is the essence of fraud. The result is a crazy-quilt of made-up doctrinal 
innovations to declare abusive trading fraudulent, either vis-à-vis other marketplace traders (the 
affirmative duty to disclose when there is a pre-existing duty of trust) or the source of the 
information (misappropriation by feigning loyalty to the entrustor). Another layer of 
complication ensues when the subject of the prosecution didn’t trade but instead gave the 
information to someone else, so that we have to ask why this communication occurred. Given 
this patchwork, it actually becomes very difficult to describe the legally required state of mind 
for insider trading prosecutions.  
But there is also an interesting psychological question. What actually is going through the 
mind of the alleged trader or tipper? Is it always simple greed? Or can there be an element of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
2 This issue is well explored in the literature. See, e.g., Allan Horwich, Possession versus 
Use: Is there a Causation Element in the Prohibition on Insider Trading?, 52 Bus. Law. 1235 
(1997); Donna M. Nagy, The Possession versus Use Debate in the Context of Trading by 
Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1129 (2009). For a 
lengthier exposition of the doctrinal issues discussed here, see Donald C. Langevoort, Insider 
Trading: Regulation, Enforcement and Prevention 3:13-.14 (2012 ed.). 
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unconscious perception—or rationalization—at work. Given the complexity and occasional 
arbitrariness of the law, what role might this indeterminacy play in trading decisions? My sense 
is that the motivations and causal explanations for what is charged as insider trading are often 
quite murky and not easily explained by pure greed. The poster example for the “what were they 
thinking” question is Martha Stewart, an extraordinarily savvy and successful businesswoman 
who went to jail for a cover-up after being accused of selling stock to avoid a loss of less than 
$50,000, a tiny fraction of her net wealth.3 This Chapter will try to connect the law of insider 
trading to a more sophisticated approach to state of mind, motivation, and causation. 
 
I. The surprisingly hard doctrinal issues in assessing state of mind for insider trading 
 
One of the necessary consequences of treating insider trading as fraud is a requirement of 
scienter. The Supreme Court has insisted that the statutory authorization for the main antifraud 
prohibition in the securities laws—§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
thereunder—requires intentionality, something more than negligence.4 But what intentionality 
means generally remains contested, with the main question being whether some form of 
recklessness can suffice. The prevailing view in the lower courts is yes, though most insist that 
                                                
3 See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.  
4 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Although such a requirement might 
not be evident from the text of Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court considered it implicit in the 
underlying statutory authorization in § 10(b). 
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the recklessness must have a subjective dimension to it, something akin to conscious or 
deliberate avoidance of the truth.5  
 Mapping this onto the law of insider trading has been difficult. As noted at the outset of 
this Chapter, the intuitive characterization with respect to trading (putting aside tipping for the 
moment) is that scienter means that the insider must have deliberately taken advantage of—that 
is, used—the information for personal gain. Use implies a causal connection between the 
information and the trade, which if broken negates the intentionality of the allegedly bad act. By 
and large, the case law invokes the use locution, often referring to the essence of insider trading 
intentionality as trading “on the basis of” the information in question.6  
Hence it is not surprising that cases have arisen where the defendant concedes (at least 
arguendo) that he came into possession of information that can be characterized as both material 
and nonpublic but that this was not the reason that he bought or sold. Rather, there was an 
entirely independent causal explanation for the trade, i.e., that he would have traded anyway, at 
the same time and in the same amount, even without access to the information. Perhaps the best 
known example of this in the case law is a director-defendant who sold a sizable amount of his 
company’s stock after receiving disappointing news about the company’s financial condition 
during a board meeting.7 His defense was that he had already made plans to sell that stock in 
                                                
5 For a discussion of the case law, see James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases 
and Materials 671-74 (6th ed. 2009). 
6 E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks read into the law a personal benefit 
requirement for purposes of the law of “tipping,” which strongly implies misuse. Id. At 662-64.   
7 See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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order to buy a large truck for his son, who was going into the transport business, so that there 
was no causal connection between what he might have learned at the meeting and the subsequent 
sale.  
Following from the intuition that insider trading is about the misuse of information, the 
court agreed that such a defense can properly be raised. To be sure, the court was extremely 
skeptical of the defense as a factual matter, and so held that a presumption of misuse was 
warranted that the defendant would then have the burden of rebutting. Some other cases, 
particularly criminal prosecutions, have articulated the same causation standard without any such 
presumption, thus apparently allocating to the prosecution the burden of proving causation.8  
That gets us into the mind of the alleged insider trader, which is inevitably very difficult. 
Some of the practical burden, however, is ameliorated by the fact that this form of subjective 
intent can be proven circumstantially—fact-finders are entitled to draw inferences about 
causation from the surrounding facts. As we shall see later on, this introduces a great deal of 
creative freedom for judges or juries to tell a story of their own making in characterizing the 
defendant’s state of mind. So, we shouldn’t overstate any burden that this way of reading the law 
puts on prosecutors or the SEC, so long as they can persuade the fact-finder of the defendant’s 
greedy character or disposition.9 
                                                
8 See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. 
Supp.2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
9 Most cases articulating a “use” requirement end up finding the standard met. E.g., 
United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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But this approach to scienter in insider trading cases has been contested, and by no means 
represents a clear statement of prevailing law. The SEC has long rejected the view that causation 
has any proper role to play: that all that is necessary is that the trader was aware of the 
information in question, which is often referred to as a “possession” test10. Hence the split among 
the courts is referred to as the “possession versus use” debate, and is controversial in discussions 
about insider trading law outside the United States as well.11  
There are numerous arguments in favor of a possession standard. Some are simply 
pragmatic—that searching for causation inside the mind of the trader is subject to too much 
confusion and potential error, and so not worth the effort. The leading court favoring a 
possession standard has said, in dicta: 
Because the advantage is in the form of information, it exists only in the mind of 
the trader. Unlike a loaded weapon, which may stand ready but unused, information 
cannot lay idle in the human brain. The individual with such information may decide to 
trade upon that information, to alter a previously decided-upon transaction, to continue 
with a previously planned transaction even though publicly available information would 
                                                
10 In re Sterling Drug Inc., 14 S.E.C. Docket 824 (1978). This was not always so: see In 
re Investors Mgt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). Investors Management involved a possession versus 
use issue beyond the scope of my Chapter: how the scienter standard applies to institutional 
trading, where there might be a separation of personnel between those who might know a fact, 
and those who determine purchases and sales. 
11 See Hui Huang, The Insider Trading “Possession versus Use” Debate: An International 
Analysis, 34 Sec. Reg. L.J. 130 (2006). 
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now suggest otherwise, or simply do nothing. . . . As a matter of policy, then, a 
requirement of a causal connection between the information and a trade could frustrate 
attempts to distinguish between legitimate trades and those conducted in connection with 
insider trading.12 
 
On a more conceptual level, there is also the point that causation is about motivation, 
which is generally said not to be crucial to a scienter inquiry in Rule 10b-5 cases. It usually 
doesn’t matter why the defendant lied (indeed, there may be good reasons to do so) but simply 
that he was aware of the truth at the time he uttered the falsity. Moreover, the idea that 
recklessness suffices for scienter strongly suggests that knowingly taking advantage of the 
information is not the only way to satisfy the state of mind requirement—recklessness comports 
better with possession than use. Finally, there is a fiduciary duty-based justification—fiduciaries 
are obliged to reveal material information known to be in their possession without any 
requirement that they be trying to gain from it. That latter point, however, may once again 
mainly show the awkwardness of trying to import so much prophylactic fiduciary duty thinking 
into a deception-oriented antifraud regime.  
The SEC did not stay idle as this split among the courts became clear. In 2000, the 
Commission sought to resolve the dispute by adopting Rule 10b5-1, which articulates the law of 
insider trading in terms of a prohibition on trading “on the basis of” inside information, but then 
defines “on the basis of” as simple awareness as per the possession test. The SEC described 
                                                
12 United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). For a more recent decision, see 
United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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awareness in familiar terms—“having knowledge; conscious; cognizant.”13 Somewhat 
surprisingly, this attempted codification of the possession standard has not been entirely 
effective. While some courts have taken it into account as authoritative, others seem to ignore 
Rule 10b5-1 and stick to the idea that causation remains the controlling requirement, albeit 
perhaps with a presumption of use.14 Possibly, this is based on the sense that scienter is 
embedded in the statutory rulemaking authorization in § 10(b), over which the Commission has 
limited power of modification. Indeed, there have been serious claims that Rule 10b5-1, in this 
one respect, was beyond the SEC’s rulemaking authority.15 
Again, we shouldn’t overstate the practical importance of all this, given the permissibility 
(indeed inevitability) of circumstantial proof of misuse. In fact, there is often a reversal of 
direction in circumstantial proof when the defendant denies any knowledge of the information 
whatsoever. Under those circumstances, courts generally permit the SEC or prosecutor to try to 
show possession circumstantially by offering evidence of misuse (e.g, patterns of behavior that 
are explainable only in terms of an effort by the defendant to take advantage of the information, 
                                                
13 See Securities Act Release 7881, Aug. 15, 2000. 
14 E.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2008); SEC v. Bauer, 2011 WL 
2115924 (E.D. Wis. 2011). 
15 See United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1167-69 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Carol 
Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 
147 (2003). 
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such as the very short time between learning it and trading, or trading in particularly large 
amounts vis-à-vis normal investing patterns).16 
So this is one place in the law where we seek to inquire into the “why” behind the choice 
to buy or sell when there is an allegation of insider trading. There are other places, however. 
One—which has not received as much judicial or academic commentary as it should—has to do 
with what we mean by awareness when there are doubts about either the materiality or public 
nature of the information.17 In other words, is it important (or essential) that the defendant 
appreciate that what is in his possession would be significant to other investors, or was 
unavailable to them. Materiality is one of the hardest fact determinations in the securities laws, 
an effort to distinguish the unimportant from the significant. Implicitly, the “use” test takes care 
of this by assuring that the information at least motivated the defendant’s trade; the “possession” 
test does not so insist, and so raises the possibility that information might objectively be 
material—or at least so judged by the fact-finder—without the defendant actually realizing that it 
was significant. The same could occur where the defendant didn’t fully appreciate the secrecy of 
the information. That is entirely plausible in cases where information may have found its way 
into the public domain, by leaks or other informal means, even though there has been no public 
announcement. Here, too, the law can be quite murky. Some courts say that broad general 
                                                
16 E.g., SEC v. Roszak, 495 F. Supp.2d 875, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
17 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 5:5; Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of 
Materiality and Recklessness in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 55 Bus. Law. 1023 (2000). 
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dissemination is necessary before information becomes public, while other suggest that enough 
leakage will suffice.18  
The final place where state of mind questions become challenging is in the law of tipping. 
The Supreme Court has allowed insider trading cases to go forward against an insider who does 
not trade but instead passes on the information to someone else.19 But to restrain liability for 
otherwise legitimate communications, the Court—at least for classical insider trading cases—
insisted on proof that the insider was breaching a fiduciary duty for personal benefit by passing 
on the information, and that the recipient knew or had reason to know of the self-serving breach. 
That once again takes us inside the mind of the insider, this time to check for selfish motivation. 
This is made partly easier by the extraordinarily capacious definition of personal benefit offered 
by the Court. The requisite personal benefit need not be pecuniary (e.g, a kick-back from the 
recipient), but can consist of a reputational gain or even the warm glow from making a gift of the 
information to a family member or friend. We have to check the mind of the recipient as well, to 
see if there was enough awareness or suspicion that selfishness was at work in motivating the 
insider’s tip. Many cases offer particularly vexing problems here, especially when there is a 
chain of tippers and tippees—the situation where the insider tells a friend, who tells some other 
acquaintances, and so on.20 
As with the other state of mind subjects we have surveyed, there is some doctrinal 
inconsistency here, too. Insider trading cases take one of two basic forms, classical or 
                                                
18 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 5:4.  
19 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
20 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 4:10-.11.  
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“misappropriation.” The test just described clearly applies in classical cases, but not necessarily 
when the allegation is that the insider-tipper defrauded the source of the information by giving it 
to someone else. While most of the time the selfish (broadly defined) motivation for the tip is 
obvious enough, the SEC and a few courts have said that it is not essential as part of the 
prosecution.21 The point seems to be that it is possible to have a purely reckless tip, where the 
tipper supposedly misappropriates by passing on the information to someone who trades not to 
facilitate that trading but with indifference to the likelihood that that would happen.  
What characterizes each of these doctrinal questions is the necessity for the fact-finder to 
enter the mind of the accused insider trader or tipper to draw some kind of inference about 
causation and/or motivation. As we shall see in the next part of this Chapter, that is laden with 
difficulty. Separately, note the doctrinal confusion in and of itself—often it is impossible to say 
with any degree of confidence whether a particular instance of trading is lawful or not. That 
indeterminacy has its own psychological consequences, as we shall also see. 
 
II. Explaining insider trading 
 
The aim of this second part is to offer a taxonomy of “state of mind” explanations for 
allegedly illegal insider trading, beyond the one possibility already discussed (trading for a 
reason other than the inside information). This is meant solely as a descriptive exercise; later on, 
the conclusion will try to link this back to the various legal muddles. Here we will be content to 
grapple with the “what were they thinking” question. 
                                                
21 For a discussion of the issue, see SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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A. Rational choice: Risks and benefits 
 
The first explanation is the simplest, and probably the most robust. Along the lines of the 
orthodox approach to the economics of criminality, we can simply say that to the person faced 
with an opportunity for insider trading, the benefits in terms of gains exceed the risk. Famously, 
James O’Hagan, the subject of the Supreme Court’s misappropriation theory decision, was 
apparently motivated by the need to avoid detection of his own embezzlement of client funds 
from the law firm’s accounts, which he was going to replace with the proceeds of the insider 
trading.22 The benefits, presumably, are mainly monetary, though we could easily add other 
forms of utility such as thrill-seeking satisfaction, status enhancement, ego gratification, and the 
like.  
The risks are impossible to assess with rigor. One can predict that if caught, the SEC will 
seek monetary recovery in the order of three times the gains from the trading,23 which would set 
up a fairly concrete decision structure. But there is also a real risk of criminal prosecution, with 
significant jail time upon conviction. In addition, there is ample collateral damage even from 
simple civil enforcement, including attorneys’ fees that may not be covered by indemnification 
or insurance, career loss and other reputational sanctions, and so forth. Even more difficult to 
assess is the risk of detection. It seems to be common wisdom that the risk of detection is quite 
                                                
22 See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 631 (8th Cir. 1996) (on remand, noting 
evidence of theft from law firm client accounts).  
23 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 8:4, 8:9.  
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low, but it is hard for anyone to know for sure. There is ample evidence of price run-ups in 
advance of public announcements of major corporate events like M&A transactions, but it is 
impossible to assess how much of this is illegal trading as opposed to information leakage, which 
(especially given the murky state of the law) may be lawful.24 The number of insider cases 
brought by the SEC in any given year is between fifty and seventy, plus a handful of criminal 
cases outside the Commission. One could reasonably conclude that the odds are strongly against 
detection. 
A recent paper by Battacharaya and Marshall seeks to address the rational choice 
structure of insider trading enforcement by looking a set of high-ranking officers of public 
companies who have been found liable for insider trading.25 Their hypothesis is that “poorer” 
managers should be more heavily represented in the sample than “richer” managers, because the 
former have less to lose, career-wise, if their unlawful trading is detected. The data, however, 
rejects that hypothesis, leading the authors to suggest that insider trading may not be an entirely 
rational choice calculation. 
 
                                                
24 See Lisa Muelbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. Fin. 1661 
(1992). 
25 See Utpal Bhattacharaya & Cassandra Marshall, Do They Do It for the Money?, 18 J. 
Corp. Fin. 92 (2012). A study of a sample of students indicates their impression, on average, that 
severity of penalties for insider trading is the primary deterrence factor. Joseph D. Beams et al., 
A Test of Deterrents to Insider Trading Using Importance Ratings, 8 Acct’g & Pub. Int. 94 
(2008). 
14 
 
B. Risk mis-estimation 
 
Because the risk estimation associated with an insider trading decision is so speculative, 
it is hard to assess its rationality. Later on, we will come back to how emotional impulses and 
other cognitive factors might bias this estimation. But before getting there, we should probably 
consider the possibility that people systematically underestimate the risk of detection, even if the 
risk is relatively low. In other words, do they perceive the risk to be even lower than it really is? 
We can only speculate. The SEC and prosecutors bring publicity to bear on their cases in 
an effort to make it seem like detection is commonplace, and we cannot rule out that this 
campaign works to inflate the perception of likelihood of detection. On the other hand, it is likely 
that insider trading opportunities arise in settings (like M&A work at an investment banking firm 
or law firm) where there are direct or indirect observations of likely illegal trading, which if not 
detected by the authorities will probably bias the judgment as to likelihood downward (as well as 
increase the ego and status pressures to conform). In this sense, insider trading is likely to be 
viral, and if the probability of detection is indeed low as a statistical matter, the perception that 
people are getting away with it will seem especially high until an enforcement action hits close to 
home.  
In any event, public knowledge of how insider traders are caught is relatively sparse 
(though maybe not in elite social and economic circles). Recent publicity about wiretaps and 
other criminal detection devices notwithstanding, most cases arise from backward induction from 
evidence of unusual stock price moves, although tips are another source.26 Thus it would not be 
                                                
26 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1:13-:15.  
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foolish to assume that if one’s trading was limited enough or disguised enough not to affect 
price, it could scarcely be detection, assuming reasonable cover-up efforts like trading through 
someone else’s account. The flaw in this thinking is in assuming that no one else is trading 
contemporaneously on the same information. But if there are other insiders, tippees or followers, 
the warning bells at the SEC and FINRA may ring even if the person’s own trading is fairly 
limited. And the data exists to find out who was trading in the right direction in the days or 
weeks before an announcement, with very sophisticated software that can identify clusters of 
trading or other factors to suggest connections among traders. From that it is just detective work, 
typically aided by “flipping” certain subjects of the investigation in order to have them reveal 
their sources, from which other contacts with that same source can then readily be identified.  
 
C. Cultural influences 
 
One of the standard critiques of the Becker model of criminality is that it underestimates 
the degree to which people will behave “appropriately” even in the absence of optimal sanctions 
because of an innate or socially constructed sense of what is right and wrong. In the social 
psychology literature, there are ample claims that at low levels of probability of detection (and 
assuming no truly draconian penalties) most people conform to expectations as to appropriate 
standards of what constitutes legitimate behavior.27 That is not the same as lawful behavior—
some forms of unlawfulness (e.g., moderate speeding on open highways) are deemed legitimate. 
                                                
27 See Mohammad Abdolmonhammadi & Jahangir Sultan, Ethical Reasoning and the Use 
of Insider Information in Stock Trading, 37 J. Bus. Ethics 165 (2002). 
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In addition, some legal rules do not have much social legitimacy, and so will carry little power in 
the absence of strong threats of punishment. Obviously, legitimacy varies in both larger and 
smaller cultures. Given the vigorous debates about whether insider trading is good or bad, one 
could reasonably predict that cynically viewing insider trading regulation as foolish or the 
product of special interest pressure would make it more likely that one would engage in unlawful 
trading.28 
There is an interesting literature emerging that seeks to test the cultural legitimacy of 
insider trading restrictions on a society-wide basis. Survey evidence by Statman asked various 
university students and finance professionals around the world to react to a fact situation based 
on the O’Hagan case, mentioned earlier, in terms of whether his behavior was fair or 
acceptable.29 That it was not acceptable was the overwhelmingly commonplace judgment in the 
USA and the Netherlands, with only slightly more ambivalence in Australia and Israel. By 
contrast, in countries like India, Turkey, and Italy, roughly half the respondents rated the 
behavior as completely acceptable. (Some evidence also ties the incidence of insider trading to 
cultural variations as to risk tolerance.30) 
                                                
28 See Joseph D. Beams et al., An Experiment Testing the Determinants of Non-
compliance with Insider Trading Laws, 45 J. Bus. Ethics 309 (2003). 
29 See Meir Statman, Perspectives: Local Ethics in a Global World, 63 Fin. Analysts J. 32 
(May-June 2007); Meir Statman, The Cultures of Insider Trading, 89 J. Bus. Ethics 51 (2009). 
30 See Bart Frijns et al., A Proclivity to Cheat: How Culture Influences Illegal Insider 
Trading, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1972585. 
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This suggests that there could easily be cultural patterns to insider trading behavior at low 
levels of detection risk, simply because of differing views as to the legitimacy of the legal 
restraints. And of course broad social or cultural forces can easily be trumped by local ones, in 
certain markets, firms or lines of business. Cultural perception, say, at an investment banking 
firm that insider trading is harmless and a sign of economic connectedness could easily blunt the 
perception of wrongfulness that otherwise might exists fairly widely in a country like the USA 
among the more general population.31  
 
D. Failure to understand (or properly apply) the law 
 
To me, one of the most likely explanations for instances of insider trading is a failure by 
the trader or tipper to properly appreciate what the law is, or to apply the law to the facts 
accurately. The issues here fall into two related categories. 
We have already seen some of the issues on which courts still have not agreed: the 
possession versus use disagreement, the precise meaning of “nonpublic,” and the role of personal 
benefit in misappropriation cases, for example. The law of insider trading has evolved in a 
common law style, so that even a well-trained lawyer could not always give a confident answer 
as to what the prevailing legal standard is.  
                                                
31 See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A 
Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1209, 1215 (2011). 
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But that problem is dwarfed by the relative indeterminacy of so many of the legal 
standards that are well established. The most obvious example is materiality, a subject that Joan 
Heminway has explored in some depth.32 Materiality refers to likely importance; in insider 
trading, it is a proxy for that which is important enough that a reasonable person would expect 
the market price to move upon discovery of the information, thereby creating a pre-discovery 
profit opportunity to exploit. To the insider or tipper, of course, that is only a prediction: the 
market reaction is observed only after the allegedly unlawful activity. Much of the time, the 
information in the insider’s possession only suggests that there might be a significant event, 
without one yet having ripened into concrete reality. This is material if, looking jointly at the 
probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the impact, the expected value of the event is 
significant enough.33 By all accounts, these are hard calculations to make prior to the event (and 
as discussed below, are subject to a very different perspective when judged in hindsight). 
Quite possibly, some insiders have no sound intuition of this, but rather assume that 
insider trading is about risk-free profits, which assumes something akin to certainty embedded in 
the secret. Even if not, insiders will often confront factual ambiguity that is not easy to assess. A 
fairly recent SEC enforcement action targeted mid-level managers at a railway company that was 
being sold. They were not privy to information about the sale, but gleaned the possibility from a 
variety of facts, including well-dressed people inspecting railway assets, unusual assignments to 
                                                
32 See Joan Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call 
for Action, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 1131 (2003). 
33 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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provide lists of such assets, and the like. The district court let the case go forward on materiality, 
while expressing some discomfort as to the softness of the “facts” in defendants’ possession.34  
There are many other areas where similarly difficult or counter-intuitive issues lurk. 
When information is sufficiently “out there” to be public is hard to assess—quite a number of 
insiders have been the subject of enforcement proceedings even though information about the 
event was already in the newspapers at the time of their trading, because the SEC contends that 
what they knew was more certain that what the media was reporting.35 The issue of duty is also 
murky. How many people not deeply familiar with the law in this area would realize that it is 
permissible to trade on most kinds of information that your overhear some executives talking at a 
restaurant, but that it is not lawful to trade on similar information heard coming from an 
executive at, say, an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting?36  
Without at this point passing judgment on insiders’ excuses as to ignorance of the law, 
the murkiness of the inferences necessary to determine legality or not connects back to our 
discussion of perceptions of legitimacy as strong indicators of behavior when likelihood of 
detection is low. Where there are competing factual inferences—i.e., the trader can say that he is 
simply being smart, not cheating—the ability to construe the trading opportunity as legitimate 
goes up.  
 
                                                
34 See SEC v. Steffes, 2012 WL 3418305 (N. D. Ill. 2012). 
35 See SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997). 
36 Compare SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) with SEC v. McGee, 
Litig. Release 22288, March 14, 2012.  
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D. Psychological bias and insider trading 
 
To this point, by and large, we have been assuming that the decision to trade or tip is a 
matter of conscious deliberation, with all these factors—anticipated gain, risk of detection, 
cultural or moral legitimacy, and legal indeterminacy—all competing to determine the judgment 
about how to act. But to most research psychologists, that would be grossly simplistic.  
Contemporary research on judgment and decision-making strongly suggests that the 
conscious portion of choice is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg, that what we are aware of is 
making a decision is often a poor representation of how or why the choice was made. The 
research is still evolving as to precisely how, when and why various factors (neurochemical, 
dispositional, situational) might dominate, but insights from cognitive neuroscience are 
increasing rapidly, including from a research subspecialty specifically devoted to economic and 
investment choice.37  
At the risk of oversimplification, the main idea here is that impulses like fear and greed 
will influence how a situation is perceived, greasing the pathway by which conscious 
deliberation follows the desire. In an interesting survey of the research for portfolio managers, 
William Bernstein writes: 
 Being evolutionarily ancient, the human limbic system does not look very 
different from that of frogs or reptiles. Located in the limbic system’s front part, just 
behind each eye, is a pair of structures called the nuclei accumbens. Neuroscientists have 
                                                
37 E.g., Andrew W. Lo, Fear, Greed and Financial Crisis: A Cognitive Neuroscience 
Perspective, in J.P. Fouque & J. Langsam, eds., Handbook on Systemic Risk, forthcoming. 
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determined that these tiny paired structures respond most intensely to the anticipation of 
reward (be it culinary, sexual, social or monetary) as opposed to the reward itself, and 
that this anticipation response can be rapidly conditioned by just a few preceding 
rewards. To label the nuclei accumbens our “greed center” is not too much of an 
exaggeration. They activate each time an investor turns on CNBC television at 9:20 a.m. 
during a bull market and connects Maria Bartiromo’s smiling, winsome visage with his or 
her escalating net worth, or when a banker contemplates a risky but potentially profitable 
loan transaction.38 
Such activation influences both what is paid attention to, and how situational variables 
are interpreted. In that sense, this process of “motivated reasoning” readily links back to each of 
the explanations for insider trading that we have considered thus far.39 As to risk perception, for 
example, even without motivation, we can misconstrue baseline risk simply because of the 
paucity of information about enforcement. But motivation can then build on this, turning the 
sense in which colleagues have (or seem to have) taken advantage of inside information into an 
artificial feeling of almost no risk. At the same time, of course, that same observation may 
increase the desire as well: as Charles Kindleberger perceptively wrote, nothing disturbs a 
person’s judgment and well-being more than watching a friend get rich.40 We can also see easily 
                                                
38 William Bernstein, Of Laws, Lending and Limbic Systems, 66 Fin. Analysts J. 17, 19 
(Jan.-Feb. 2010). 
39 E.g., David M. Bershoff, Why Good People Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated 
Reasoning and Unethical Behavior, 25 Personality & Soc. Psych. Bull. 28 (1999). 
40 Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Crashes and Panics 15 (4th ed. 2000). 
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enough how desire will also influence the perception of legitimacy. What is fair is very much in 
the mind of the beholder, and can represent little more than the rationalization of wants.41 
But it is the indeterminacy of the law, and factual inferences relating thereto, where 
particularly powerful greasing can take place. The mind will try to find ways to construe the 
situation so as to invoke real or imagined excuses and safe harbors. A director learning bad news 
about his or her company may come to think that a decision to sell was actually made some time 
ago based on other circumstances, but just delayed—the inside information is not really being 
“used.” Uncertainty might be inflated to diminish the perception of materiality; imagining that 
others must know (and be acting) on the information will blunt the inference of non-publicness. 
These are just inferences from the psychological research, of course. We cannot study the 
mind of the insider trader directly.42 But we have some anecdotal glimpses to draw from, the 
most celebrated of which is the story of Martha Stewart’s troubles stemming from her sales of 
stock in ImClone in December 2001. Stewart was a friend an acquaintance of the founder of 
                                                
41 For a book-length treatment of these kinds of processes generally Max H. Bazerman & 
Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do About It 
(2011). 
42 There are occasional “mea culpas” from convicted insider traders, trying to explain 
their thinking—often by reference to pervasive rationalizations or stupidity. Dennis Levine, one 
of the first major insider traders to be exposed, has offered one such account. See Dennis B. 
Levine, The Inside Story of an Inside Trader, available at 
http://techsci.msun.edu/wilke/BUS%20Courses/BUS%20405/Spring%2005%20Pages/Finance%
20and%20Accountancy/Insider%20Trading/Inside%20Story/Inside%20Story.pdf.  
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ImClone, and they shared the same stockbroker (Bacanovic) at Merrill Lynch. They all knew that 
ImClone was soon about to receive a highly significant ruling from the FDA about an important 
drug under development. On December 27, she received a call from Baconovic’s assistant while 
on a holiday flight, telling her essentially that ImClone was trading down and the Waksal’s were 
selling their stock. She immediately told the broker’s assistant to sell her stock as well, and just 
avoided a loss of approximately $45,000 from so doing. 
On its face, this was at least a reckless decision. Stewart sold the stock in a highly visible 
account at a well-known broker-dealer as a result of information at least closely connected to the 
top levels of management at ImClone. She was reasonably familiar with the prohibition against 
insider trading, though perhaps not all its nuances. Even conceding some difficult legal issues as 
to whether she could take advantage of this information or not, the risk should have been 
palpable. So what was she thinking? 
This takes us to Stewart's thought-process that day, and here we can draw on some 
background facts provided by behavioral finance scholar Meir Statman.43 Stewart was not a very 
                                                
43 The specifics facts recounted here are drawn from Meir Statman, Martha Stewart’s 
Lessons in Behavioral Finance, 7 J. Inv. Consulting 1 (2005). For an elaboration, from which 
much of the following analysis is taken, see Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and 
the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 10 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 1 (2006). Interesting commentary on her trial is found in Jeffrey Toobin, A Bad Thing: 
Why Did Martha Stewart Lose?, The New Yorker, March 22, 2004, at 61, and Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2023 
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successful investor. She had a portfolio loaded with technology stocks (ImClone, in the biotech 
field, was one), and was badly hurt by the technology sector sell-off that occurred in 2000 and 
2001. Her portfolio value (excluding MSLO) declined from $4,530,730 in June 2000 to 
$2,510,973 in December 2001. 
What was most notable is how reluctant she was to sell her stocks, which may connect to 
a tendency often noted in the behavioral finance literature. Stewart was regularly favored with 
IPO allocations, meaning that she was able to buy the stocks at a deep discount to likely near-
term market values. Whether or not they "flip" immediately, many investors take their profit in 
the near-term. Stewart did not, holding the shares through expectedly dramatic price increases 
and then, later on, through the bursting of the tech stock bubble. She thus managed to lose money 
even having started in such an extraordinarily favorable position.  
Whose fault this was is not clear; Stewart apparently blamed Bacanovic and Merrill. In 
any event, Bacanovic met with Stewart in mid-December to urge her sell her "loss" stocks before 
the end of the year to offset against taxable income. They discussed each of the holdings, 
including ImClone, and Stewart finally sold off all twenty-two of her loss stocks on December 
21 and 24 for a combined loss of $1,037,874. Because ImClone was one of her few profitable 
stocks (and by far her most profitable), she held onto it. She had bought ImClone at $16, and as 
of mid-December had a gain of some $186,000. Crucially, Stewart said that this selling “made 
her stomach turn,” an interesting psychological point. In fact, the tax losses were quite valuable 
given Stewart's other income. However, having to finally admit defeat and take the losses—
                                                                                                                                                       
(2005). For a book containing various perspectives on the case, see Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Martha Stewart’s Legal Troubles (2007). 
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notwithstanding such potential for gain a year or two earlier—was devastating to Stewart's ego, 
and generated a good deal of anger and regret. So far as her investments were concerned, Stewart 
was in late December in an emotionally depressed state. 
Then, on December 27, just three days after the stomach-turning sales were done, she got 
the phone call from Bacanovic's assistant indicating that her only remaining winner, ImClone, 
was also about to implode. One can at least appreciate what was no doubt a very emotional 
response—not this one, too. If she had a chance to avoid this loss by selling before the market 
adjusted, such risky behavior can at least be placed in context,44 though it certainly wouldn't be a 
defense to insider trading. 
But what about the legal risk? Consider what Stewart learned from Bacanovic's assistant. 
Initially, there were two bits of information in the phone message—that the Waksals were selling 
and that Bacanovic expected the price to decline. She called the broker's assistant and learned 
one more fact—that the price had already fallen a good bit. My suspicion is that (especially in an 
angry and emotional state) she could easily construe this to mean that adverse information had 
already reached the market, and the big institutions were starting to bail out. She did not want to 
be left behind, again. 
As to the Waksals' selling, I suspect that she construed this as the Waksals and much of 
Wall Street. In fact, it is hard to imagine (especially to a former stockbroker) that she would 
assume that she was being told that the Waksals were selling illegally—which would be the case 
if the information had not yet made it to the market. Illegal sales by senior executives do not 
usually occur in an unconcealed fashion through a reputable broker. Again, the more likely 
                                                
44 See Statman, supra note 43.  
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inference is that word about Erbitux had become public and that the Waksals were joining the 
crowd. 
Whether this is a successful defense as a matter of law is a bit murky. As Rule 10b5-1 
shows, the SEC prefers a simplified state of mind inquiry, and could claim that even if the 
foregoing were true (1) Stewart still had one piece of information that the rest of the world did 
not, received from a private source in arguable breach of fiduciary duty; (2) under these 
circumstances, she recklessly failed to ascertain the state of public knowledge before selling; and 
(3) that information does not become public until it is fully internalized by the market (i.e., 
trading by the smart money is not enough if the price is still adjusting).  
But I doubt that under the emotional pressure prompting so many psychologically potent 
forces—loss aversion, regret, and stomach-turning shame—she would have construed the 
situation with such acuity. Her mind wanted to sell that stock, and the construal gave her 
permission to do so. Others were selling, so she could, too. Bad judgment, perhaps, but not all 
that surprising psychologically. Like so many bad judgments by those with high ego and self-
esteem, it generated a poorly-executed cover-up, which is what actually landed Martha Stewart 
in jail. 
 
III. Connecting the explanations and the law 
 
Our remaining task in this Chapter is to connect these explanations to the legal 
conundrums discussed in the first part. Obviously, when insider trading is a deliberate choice to 
assume the risk of detection because of the expected utility in terms of money, thrill, ego or 
whatever, the explanations add little. The penalty structure of USA insider trading law is built on 
27 
 
the implicit assumption that these cases are about greed, and can be deterred by getting the right 
mix of sanctions and detection resources. We might not have the optimal mix, but it would not 
be because we misunderstand what is happening. If anything, stopping here underscores the idea 
that “misuse” of inside information is what we are trying to reach, so that courts that prefer that 
formulation of the law have it right.  
That there might well be individual or cultural legitimation of insider trading at work 
when someone chooses this same risk might alter the characterization of what is going on—there 
is a rejection rather than an appreciation of wrongdoing—but that is not a particularly troubling 
legal issue, either. Similarly, misconstrual of the law generally is met with the response that 
ignorance is no excuse. It does get harder, however, when misconstruals go to facts (like 
materiality or non-publicness) rather than law (duty). Scienter does suggest that there must be 
some contemporaneous appreciation of both significance and secrecy to which eyes are being 
shut. As suggested in our discussion of the Martha Stewart case, I think there was a plausible 
argument that she thought—too hastily, perhaps, but without conscious doubt—that word of the 
FDA action had become public knowledge at least within sophisticated trading markets, which 
could be a defense to liability. Here the stress turns to recklessness, and the difficulties in 
drawing the line between deliberate indifference to a known risk and conduct that, in hindsight at 
least, is hard to explain. That said, if insider trading law is meant to address deliberate 
exploitation of entrusted information, extending liability too far in the direction of recklessness is 
unnecessary to carry out the law’s expressive function.  
Indeed, one of the least understood issues in insider trading law today is the role of 
recklessness. What would we mean by reckless insider trading? One can readily imagine a case 
where an executive suspects good or bad news at the time he directs a trade without being sure 
28 
 
and proceeds to buy or sell anyway, but this type of case need not reach for recklessness because 
the very set of facts that made him aware of the risk would probably be material nonpublic 
information. A possession rather than use standard would no doubt be helpful to the enforcers in 
a case such as this, but that is simply a practical advantage in dealing with uncertainty, one of the 
standard arguments for a possession test.  
When we turn to tipping, however, we see more room for argument. Suppose a person 
passes on information to another without actually intending to make a tip (much less for personal 
benefit), but under circumstances where there is a cognizable risk that trading will result. The 
personal benefit test makes enforcement under the classical theory hard here, but—under 
substantial SEC prodding, as we saw earlier—a number of courts say that test does not apply in 
misappropriation cases. Probably, the main effect of this line of authority is to open up the 
possibility of reckless tipping. There are a number of cases that might fit this category, most 
notably those involving employees of magazine printers who sold advance copies of the 
magazines (e.g., Business Week) to persons who wanted to know what companies would be 
mentioned favorably, in order to profit from the anticipated market rise.45 It was not clear that the 
employees necessarily knew of this intent, and there were other reasons the purchasers might 
have wanted advance copies besides the intent to trade. Here, however, we still have a solid 
“greed” story. 
As we turn to the possible psychological explanations for trading or tipping, the law’s 
standards seem more naive. For example, a standard that requires a fact-finder to determine that 
the receipt of the inside information “caused” the trade assumes an overly simple model of 
                                                
45 See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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decision-making. Insiders can easily come to believe that they really did have other reasons for 
trading, and apart from rough assessments of credibility, fact-finders have little to guide them in 
determining if this is right. The Second Circuit, quoted earlier, was reasonably sophisticated in 
its skeptical assessment of this task.46  
On the other hand, a standard of “awareness” fares poorly from a psychological 
standpoint, too. If there is a punch line to the research we have described, it is that much of what 
is crucial to behavior occurs outside of awareness, with awareness generating something of a 
false consciousness. That is to say, some subset of what we treat as insider trading—some, but 
by no means all—probably is not experienced by the individual in question as awareness that any 
material nonpublic information is being exploited. A hard question in the law of insider trading is 
how to characterize the behavior of someone who we think should have known better but may 
have lacked the contemporaneous appreciation ordinarily associated with scienter. Once again, 
this is work usually done by invoking recklessness, which is not a particularly good fit with what 
we mean by insider trading. 
However, we shouldn’t obsess too much on all this. All these scienter labels are attached 
by judges and jurors acting outside the mind of the defendant, in hindsight.47 The uncertainties 
and ambiguities that might have clouded the mind of the defendant at the time will not be at 
work in their own minds as they pass judgment. The certainty of the money made by the 
defendant will be particularly salient, and the tendency to explain behavior in terms of individual 
                                                
46 See U.S. v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). . 
47 See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004). 
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disposition—referred to by psychologists as the fundamental attribution bias—means that the 
fact-finder will interpret the story more readily in terms of intentionality.  
None of this is necessarily unique to the law of insider trading—all forms of law that 
depend on relatively exacting state of mind standards suffer if they ask fact-finders to determine 
liability through simplistic labels like intent or recklessness. But insider trading is somewhat 
unique because, for better or worse, we have made a level of evil disproportionate to its actual 
economic impact. If insider trading prosecutions are intended as little morality plays in the name 
of promoting a brand that is about fair play in the securities markets, as I suggested at the outset, 
we should worry at least a little about what really was in the mind of the trader or tipper unless 
we are just making examples of them for public consumption.  
 
 
